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PATENT VENUE: MODERN MARKETING ACTIVITY AS ACTS
OF INFRINGEMENT-THE CONTINUITY STANDARD
INTRODUCTION

The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over patent causes.'
Since the federal judicial system divides the nation into eleven circuits
with over 400 permanent judgeships,2 it seems inevitable that federal
courts throughout the country have different attitudes toward patent
validity. Indeed, some circuits are more "friendly" toward patent validity
than others,' and, as a result, the choice of forum in a patent infringement suit can be crucial. Before a federal court can hear a suit against
an individual or a corporation, it must, of course, be shown that venue
requirements are satisfied. Thus, the complex problem of venue in patent
infringement suits is important.
It is well established that venue in patent infringement actions is
governed exclusively by 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) :
Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the
judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the
defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular
and established place of business.'
The statute sets forth two alternative requirements for patent venue:
the defendant must either 1) reside in the judicial district,' or 2) have
a regular and established place of business and have committed acts of
infringement within the judicial district.
This note will consider the venue problems of P Corporation; P
has been issued a patent which it believes D Corporation is infringing.
P wishes to bring an infringement action against D in P's home district;
defendant D is a non-resident who has a regular and established place of
business in the district. The first alternative of the patent venue statute
cannot be met since D is a non-resident; the second alternative, howl. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8; 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1964).
2. OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, U.S. GOV'T. ORGANIZATION MANUAL 46 (197071) ; 28 U.S.C.A. § 133 (Supp. 1971).
3. Seidel, Venue in Patent Litigation, 22 Go. WAsH. L. REv. 682 (1954).
4. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957); Stonite
Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561 (1942).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1964).
6. It has been held that a corporation "resides" only in the state of its incorporation. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957); Ruth v.
Eagle-Picher Co., 225 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1955).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1971

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 3 [1971], Art. 6

604

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5

ever, can be met by showing that acts of infringement were committed
by D within the district. An "act of infringement" is committed by one
who "without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention,
within the United States during the term of the patent therefor."" D
has engaged in extensive marketing activity but has neither sold, in a
commercial sense, nor manufactured the product within the district.
Since D has not manufactured the alleged infringing product within the
judicial district, proper venue requires a showing that D's marketing
activity constitutes either using or selling the product within the district.
The writer will review the standards presently being applied in the
Seventh Circuit to determine what marketing activity constitutes "acts
of infringement" for venue purposes and will also discuss the possible
inadequacy of the standards when applied to modern marketing behavior.
MARKETING ACTIVITY AS ACTS OF INFRINGEMENT

The plaintiff-patentee generally has the burden of establishing venue
in an infringement suit.' Consequently, before its case can be heard, P,
described above, must show that the defendant, D, has committed acts
of infringement within the district.' D has neither manufactured nor
completed sales of the alleged infringing product within the district.
Accordingly, P must prove that D's marketing activities (demonstrations, advertisements and solicitations of orders for the accused product)
constitute acts of infringement. In other words, the plaintiff must show
that one who engages in marketing activities, which are not technically
completed sales within the district,"0 either "uses" or "sells" the
product within the district. Here P encounters a stumbling block.
Courts in the past have interpreted "sells" to require proof of
"completed sales" within the judicial district. 1 Under this view, P
could not establish venue since D has not technically completed any sales
7. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1964).
8. 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1326 n.6 (2d ed. 1964) ; see, e.g., McGah v. V-M
Corp., 166 F. Supp. 662 (N.D. Ill. 1958).

9. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1964).
10. When a dealer solicits an order for goods in one State and forwards it
to a manufacturer at its home office in another State and the goods are shipped
direct by the manufacturer, the sale is considered as having been made in the
latter State and does not constitute an infringement of a patent in the former State.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. International Plastic Corp., 159 F.2d 554, 560 (7th
Cir. 1947).
11. Discussion of marketing activity in patent venue cases is abundant. See W.S.
Tyler Co. v. Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co., 236 U.S. 723 (1915); Dow Chemical Co. v.
Melton Corp., 281 F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 1960); Bulldog Elec. Prods. Co. v. Cole Elec.
Prods. Co., 134 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1943); Endrezze v. Dorr Co., 97 F.2d 46 (9th Cir.
1938) ; Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Stanley Elec. Mfg. Co., 116 F. 641 (C.C.S.
D.N.Y. 1902) ; S.O.S. Co. v. Bolta Co., 117 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ill. 1953).
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within the district. The research of P's counsel reveals, however, that
modern courts consider this rule harsh. Although there is much authority
that patent venue provisions are not to be liberally construed,12 the
recent trend is to liberalize the meaning of "sells" as it relates to patent
s
venue.'
Some courts have avoided the strict requirement of a completed
sale by finding an infringing "use"" in marketing activities which are
not technically sales,'" such as solicitation of orders for an infringing
product which are accepted solely outside the judicial district. Ronson
Art Metal Works, Inc. v. Brown & Bigelow, Inc.'6 held that continuous
solicitation of orders through demonstration of the accused infringing
device to prospective buyers was a sufficient "use" of the product to
meet the "acts of infringement" requirement of section 1400(b). In reaching the result, the court considered the legislative direction which, according to the court, "looks to plurality and continuity of conduct."" Another
case relying on "use" was Transmirra Products Corp. v. Magnavox
Co.'" Within the district, the defendant engaged in a "continuous course
of business activity,"' 9 and it participated in two trade shows where the
allegedly infringing products were displayed in exhibits manned by
members of the defendant's advertising department. From this display
it was held that there was an infringing "use" within the district even
though the accused products were taken out of the district at the conclusion of the trade shows.
Later cases continue the liberal trend but disapprove of finding
infringing "use" in solicitation of orders and other marketing activity,
preferring to call such activity infringing "sales." Union Asbestos &
Rubber Co. v. Evans Products Co.2" disparages the finding by the courts
of infringing "use" in solicitation of sales, pointing out that this "has
resulted in a rather strained interpretation of infringing 'use.' 21 The
12. Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, 365 U.S. 260, 264 (1961); Mid-Continent
Metal Prods. Co. v. Maxon Premix Burner Co., 367 F.2d 818, 820 (7th Cir. 1966).
13. Union Asbestos & Rubber Co. v. Evans Prods. Co., 328 F.2d 949 (7th Cir.
1964).
14. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1964). See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
15. Cf. Scott & Williams, Inc. v. Hemphill Co., 14 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
Defendant operated an allegedly infringing knitting machine both as a demonstration to
prospective buyers and as a way of making sample stockings to send out to the trade.
The court found that the machine was operated with a fair degree of continuity and
that such operation constituted an infringing "use" of the machine.
16. 104 F. Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
17. Id. at 724.
18. 110 F. Supp. 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
19. Id. at 677.
20. 328 F.2d 949 (7th Cir. 1964).
21. Id. at 951.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1971

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 3 [1971], Art. 6

606

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5

court held that two demonstrations by the defendants of the accused
infringing device together with "systematic and continuous solicitation
of orders within the district" were sufficient to amount to "infringing
sales."2 2 The court concluded that a "completed sale" was not necessary:
We do not think the dicta in Tyler, Bulldog, and Endrezze
compels us to decide that a completed sale was necessary for a
finding of venue. The "completed sale" notion [was] derived
from the formulation of a rule, without authority cited, by a
single judge of the old circuit court of the Southern District of
New York....

[2]

[T]he technicalities of sales law should not control
whether defendant's degree of conduct within the district was
sufficient to constitute "acts of infringement" for venue purposes. The degree of selling in the case before us is a sufficient
impairment of plaintiff's "right to exclude others from making,
using, or selling" its invention so as to constitute an act of
infringement within the district for venue purposes.2"
The Seventh Circuit, then, no longer requires a completed sale in
establishing acts of infringement under section 1400(b)."
A search for a common denominator in these cases reveals two
controlling factors: 1) level of marketing activity and 2) continuity.
Level of Marketing Activity
On a vertical scale which measures the defendant's marketing
activity, there is a mystical level above which venue will be granted and
below which it will be denied. The scale measures the type of activity,
not the volume."6 The activity's nature, not its frequency, is important.
22. Id. at 952 (emphasis added).
23. See note 11 supra and accompanying text. The court was referring to Judge
Lacombe's opinion in Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Stanley Elec. Mfg. Co., 116 F.
641 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1902).
24. 328 F.2d at 952 (footnotes omitted).
25. See Briggs v. Fram Corp., 272 F. Supp. 185 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Briggs v.
Gould-National Batteries, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 186 (N.D. Ill. 1967). Venue was found
although sales were not completed in the judicial district but were forwarded outside the
district for final acceptance. Defendant's salesmen continuously solicited orders for the
accused device and were equipped with samples, catalogs and brochures.
26. Volume becomes important if the defense of de minimis is raised. The purpose
of the de minimis rule is to determine whether total damage to the plaintiff throughout
the country warrants an exercise of the court's jurisdiction. Since venue is based only on
acts within the judicial district, it seems that de minimis should not be considered in
venue proceedings. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Philadelphia Pneumatic Tool Co., 118
F. 852 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1902). See also Hutter v. De Q. Bottle Stopper Co., 128 F. 283
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The highest level of marketing activity on the scale is denoted by completed sales where both the buyer and the seller were in the judicial
district." A single sale completed in the district will also sustain venue
and is equally high on the scale." Close to the mystical level, yet still
above it, is a sale where the product is shipped f.o.b. to a destination
within the district." A sale f.o.b. outside the district is below the level
and will not support venue."0 Also below the level are most other marketing activities: solicitation within the district of orders accepted solely
outside the district,8 ' demonstrations and exhibitions of the accused
device or the presence of spare parts,8 2 and the presence of promotional
literature within the judicial district.88 The mere sale of a "shopworn
sample" may be insufficient to establish an act of infringement." Radio
and television advertising within the judicial district will not of itself
sustain venue; advertising which reaches the district from a point outside
is even lower on the scale. Mere display in the district of an infringing
product does not constitute an act of infringement.8"
Although many courts believe it is necessary to liberalize the meaning of "sells" as it relates to patent venue, they have been unwilling to
(2d Cir. 1904) ; Systron-Donner Corp. v. Palomar Scientific Corp., 239 F. Supp. 148
(N.D. Cal. 1965).
27. See, e.g., Knapp-Monarch Co. v. Casco Prods. Corp., 342 F.2d 622, 624 (7th
Cir. 1965).
28. Latini v. R.M. Dubin Corp., 90 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. I1l. 1950) (one sale of a
chocolate decorating machine within the district satisfied the section 1400(b) requirement
of acts of infringement). See also Hutter v. De Q. Bottle Stopper Co., 128 F. 283, 285
(2d Cir. 1904) (a single infringing sale made "in circumstances which indicate a readiness to make other similar sales" is actionable). If an infringing sale is actionable, it is a
fortiori sufficient to establish venue; "the test used to determine whether an act of
infringement has occurred within the district [for venue] is naturally less strict than
that used when the case is tried on the merits." Dover Corp. v. Fisher Governor Co.,
221 F. Supp. 716, 720 (S.D. Tex. 1963).
29. S.O.S. Co. v. Bolta Co., 117 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ill. 1953). Although the order
for the sale of the accused product was accepted outside Illinois, the contract specified
f.o.b. Chicago. The court held the sale was completed in Chicago and constituted an act
of infringement.
30. Welding Eng'rs., Inc. v. Aetna-Standard Eng'r. Co., 169 F. Supp. 146 (W.D.
Pa. 1958). The infringing devices were shipped f.o.b. Warren, Ohio. The court found
venue did not lie in the western district of Pennsylvania since the sale was completed in
Ohio.
31. See note 36 infra and accompanying text.
32. Lindly & Co. v. Karl H. Inderfurth Co., 190 F. Supp. 875 (E.D.N.C. 1961).
See note 60 infra and accompanying text.
33. See T.P. Laboratories, Inc. v. Ormco Corp., 389 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1968), in
which the display by the defendant of a catalog illustrating the infringing device at the
office which served as a base for its two traveling salesmen was not a sufficient act to
establish venue.
34. I-oegger v. F.H. Lawson & Co., 35 F.2d 219, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) (dictum).
35. Cf. Marlatt v. Mergenthaler Linotype Co., 70 F. Supp. 426 (S.D. Cal. 1947)
(mere display of the infringing article does not constitute infringing use).
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lower the level of marketing activity necessary to sustain venue." For
example, proof of solicitation of orders within the district, which are
accepted solely outside the district, will not of itself sustain venue." In
lieu of a lower venue-granting level, the concept of continuity has evolved.
Continuity of Marketing Activity
When the marketing activity is continuous, the courts have been
willing to combine several below-level activities, pushing the level of
marketing activity above the venue-granting mark. 8 In Stiegele v.
Jacques Kreisler Manufacturing Corp.,9 the defendant, from a regional
office within the district, solicited orders which were accepted at its
out-of-state home office. The regional office was the headquarters for
several salesmen and was the location of samples which were demonstrated by an employee of the defendant. The court held that continuous
and systematic exhibition and demonstration of the accused product,
coupled with the systematic and continuous solicitation of orders within
the district, sufficed as acts of infringement for the purposes of venue.4"
The alleged infringer in Gwynne v. Michael Flynn Manufacturing
Co.41 maintained, within the judicial district, an office wherein physical
specimens of the accused device and sales catalogs were displayed.

Five "consultants" systematically solicited orders for the accused product
which were accepted only outside the district. Although the plaintiff did
not allege that any sales were made within the district, the court found
that proper venue had been established, quoting Stiegele's holding that
36. See Grantham v. Challenge-Cook Bros., Inc., 420 F.2d 1182 (7th Cir. 1969);
Mid-Continent Metal Prods. Co. v. Maxon Premix Burner Co., 367 F.2d 818 (7th
Cir. 1966); Welding Eng'rs., Inc. v. Aetna-Standard Eng'r. Co., 169 F. Supp. 146
(W.D. Pa. 1958).
37. See Grantham v. Challenge-Cook Bros., Inc., 420 F.2d 1182, 1185 (7th Cir.
1969). An argument can be made for lowering the venue-granting level to include

solicitation of orders. After the order is accepted outside the district, the infringing
product is shipped to the buyer f.o.b. "shipment" and the sale is technically completed

outside the district. See note 10 supra and accompanying text. Union Asbestos and its
progeny have urged a non-technical application of the sales law for venue purposes. See
note 24 supra and accompanying text. Under this view, delivery via common carrier into
the district should constitute a sale for venue purposes, irrespective of where title (or risk
of loss) passed. The patentee's exclusive right to sell the product is eroded no less because the title technically passed outside the district. See notes 47-49 infra and accompanying text. Cf. Sunbury Wire Rope Mfg. Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 129 F.
Supp. 425 (E.D. Pa. 1955) (the court sustained venue under the Clayton Act in an antitrust suit by finding that a delivery to the buyer f.o.b. seller's place of business was a
"transaction of business" in the buyers state).
38. See notes 15-25 supra and accompanying text.

39. 213 F. Supp. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
40. Id. at 496.
41. 227 F. Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol5/iss3/6
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continuous exhibition, demonstration and solicitation of orders within
the district supported venue under section 1400(b).4"
In Watsco, Inc. v. Henry Valve Co.,4 the court held that venue was
properly based on infringing sales when the alleged infringer systematically and continually solicited orders within the district and equipped its
sales representatives with product samples and catalogs for use in demonstration of the accused infringing product within the district. The
court spoke of chipping away the shaky foundation of the moribund
doctrine of the completed sale.44 It held that
[a] completed sale within the district is not required when
there has been continuous solicitation of orders in addition to
exhibitions, demonstrations, or the physical presence of the
product within the district.4
When courts grant venue based on a combination of marketing
activities which are less than completed sales within the district, they
emphasize the "continuous and systematic" nature of the activites.4 ' The
purpose of this liberal view toward venue is to give effect to the legislative
policy behind patents given in 35 U.S.C. § 154; under the statute, a
patentee acquires the "right to exclude others from making, using, or
selling" its invention.' The Watsco court argued that continuous solicitation of orders and other marketing activities are a derogation of and
an interference with the patentee's exclusive patent right irrespective
of where the orders are finally accepted. The court explained:
It does not comport with reason to require a plaintiff patentee
to chase the alleged infringer to the defendant's home district
simply because sales orders are approved there, while all the
while sales representatives of the defendant are continually
present in the district and the alleged infringing device is
delivered and displayed within the district.4"
Ronson states that "[the legislative direction looks to plurality and
continuity of conduct."4 9
Completed sales, then, are no longer required to establish patent
42. Id. at 358.
43.

232 F. Supp. 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).

44. Id. at 45.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
See notes 15-25 supra and accompanying text.
35 U.S.C.§ 154 (1964).
232 F. Supp. 38 at 46 (emphasis added).
104 F.Supp. 716 at 724. See also note 24 supra and accompanying text.
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venue since consideration of the policy behind patents has required a
more liberal standard.5" The two factors which courts now consider
when determining whether marketing activities satisfy the "acts of
infringement" requirement for venue are the level and continuity of the
activity. When the alleged infringer's marketing activities include completed sales within the district, venue is granted without considering
continuity. Continuity is important only when the level itself is not high
enough to establish venue. If continuity is found, the court will add the
elements of marketing activity together to determine whether the new
level is above the venue-granting mark.
P Corporation,introduced earlier, can bring an infringement action
against D Corporation in P's home district if it can establish that D's
marketing activities there were "continuous and systematic," and if the
combined marketing activities are comparable to the degree of activity
found in other cases. While the level-continuity standard mitigates the
inequities of the completed sale requirement, it is possible that the new
test may itself cause hardships. If, after the plaintiff is issued his patent,
he must wait until the defendant's infringing marketing activities are
"'continuous" before he can sue, he may lose his chance for recovery of
infringement damages.
A

PROBLEM UNDER THE CONTINUITY STANDARD

Continuity Over Two Days
It is not clear whether under the level-continuity standard venue
would be granted if the following facts were added to P's venue problems:
P has filed its patent infringement suit the day after (say May 7) its
patent was issued (May 6)." D has extensively marketed the alleged
infringing product in the district both before and after the patent was
issued, but none of its sales of the product were completed within the
district. These were substantially the facts of a recent case, Archer
Daniels Midland Co. v.Ralston Purina Co.52 To establish venue under
section 1400(b), the plaintiff must show that acts of infringement have
been committed by the defendant within the judicial district.5" There can
be no infringement, however, until the patent is issued (May 6)." It is
50. See notes 47-49 supra and accompanying text.
51. The plaintiff could be involved in a "race to the courthouse" because the
defendant hopes to file a suit for a declaratory judgment against the validity of the
patent in his home district which may be more likely to declare the patent invalid. See
notes 3 supra and 74 infra and accompanying text.
52. 321 F. Supp. 262 (S.D. Ill. 1971).
53. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
54. American Ornamental Bottle Corp. v. Orange-Crush Co., 76 F.2d 969 (4th

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol5/iss3/6

et al.: Patent Venue: Modern Marketing as Acts of Infringement—The Contin

19711

PATENT VENUE

also clear from the patent venue statute that the words "has committed"
imply that the acts of infringement must be committed before the
bringing of the suit (May 7). "5 Hence, when the infringement suit is
filed the day after the patent is issued, the acts of infringement must be
shown to have taken place within a two-day period (May 6-May 7).11
According to the Ralston court, the whole of May 6 will be within the
period, no matter what time of day the patent was issued. Furthermore,
all events of May 7 will also be within the determinative period, irrespective of the time the suit was filed." Consequently, even if the infringement
suit is filed ten minutes after the patent was issued, the courts will
consider the events of at least one entire day."
Since D has not completed sales within the district, the level of
marketing activity will not sustain venue and P must establish continuity
before its case will be heard. It is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive
how acts committed during a two-day period can be continuous and
systematic within the meaning of Union Asbestos.59 If the court considers only acts of the defendant that D committed on May 6 and 7, P
cannot establish the continuity of D's activity which is necessary to show
acts of infringement and, thereby, sustain venue.
Past Treatment
Must, however, the facts which establish continuity occur after the
patent is granted and before the suit is filed? It is unclear whether courts
applying the level-continuity standard will require that continuity be
proved only by events within the interval. In Lindley & Co. v. Karl H.
Inderfurth Co.,6" the patent infringement suit was filed the same day
Cir. 1935). The court held that "there can be no infringement of a patent prior to its
issue, and no accounting of profits or assessment of damages except for the period which
follows the grant .... " Id. at 971. See also Anchor Hocking Glass Corp. v. White Cap
Co., 47 F. Supp. 451 (D. Del. 1942).

55. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Fox Typewriter Co., 158 F. 476, 483 (C.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1907).
56. As a condition precedent to the right of a patent holder to maintain an
action for infringement of his patent, it must be established that the defendant
has committed some act of infringement after the patent was issued, prior to
the institution of the suit, and before the expiration of the statute of limitations.
Lambert v. Dempster Bros., 34 F. Supp. 610, 616 (E.D. Tenn. 1940).
57. 321 F. Supp. 262 at 265.
58. Ralston holds that all transactions on the same day are to be regarded as
occurring at the same instant of time unless this would result in a manifest injustice.
321 F. Supp. 262 at 265.
59. Union Asbestos & Rubber Co. v. Evans Prods. Co., 328 F.2d 949 (7th Cir.
1964). See notes 20-24 supra and accompanying text.
60. 190 F. Supp. 875 (E.D.N.C. 1961). The defendant's single employee in the
district worked out of his own home where he kept spare parts and literature for the
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the patent was issued. The court did not consider the importance of the
date of patent issue. When looking for acts of infringement to establish
venue, the court considered acts which took place before the patent was
issued. It denied venue because the acts did not establish continuity or
plurality.
The Ralston court also faced the problem of events outside the
interval:
The court realizes that activities of the defendant with regard
to the accused product which are outside the critical period are
generally irrelevant.There is some exception to this general rule,
however, for these activities may be relevant for reasonable
inferences to understand what the defendant's activities during
the critical time probably were. 6'
No authority for the exception is cited, however, and no attempt is made
to define its limits other than to require that the excepted evidence has
some probative value as to activities within the period. Ralston did not
meet the issue of whether activities outside the period can be used to
establish continuity. While the court's opinion was that before, during
and after the critical period the defendant conducted a continuous program
of sales solicitation in the district, it held that its acts "during [the
critical period] were sufficient to constitute acts of infringement for
venue purposes."8 2 The court cited facts which occurred both within and
without the critical period. Although a large portion of the judicial
district was an "official test market area" for the defendant's infringing
product," there were no completed sales within the critical period. Consequently, under the level-continuity standard of Union Asbestos, which
the court relied upon, the defendant's activities must be continuous to
support venue. The court concluded that "there was sufficient specific
sales activity within the district and within the critical period to properly
subject the defendant to venue here," and that "some continuous solicita' The
tion for sales was being carried on throughout the critical period."64
case held, therefore, either that marketing activity at a level below
completed sales can establish venue without continuity or that continuity
allegedly infringing device. He made a delivery of the accused device in the state but
in a different district; he demonstrated the device but to college students who were not
prospective buyers. The court denied venue because the marketing activity did not constitute the required plurality and continuity.
61. 321 F. Supp. at 265 (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 265-66.
63. Id. at 266.
64. Id. at 267, 268 (emphasis added).
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can be established by acts outside the critical period. It is difficult to tell
from the opinion whether Ralston lowered the level of marketing activity
necessary to sustain venue or applied acts outside the critical period to
the continuity standard. Previous courts have not been willing to lower
the venue-granting level," but there is some support for permitting acts
outside the critical period to establish continuity.6
A Suggested Solution
The courts have not met squarely the issue of the relevancy of
marketing activity outside the determinative period. From a consideration of policy and rules of evidence, however, it seems that the courts
should look both before and after the crucial period to determine continuity. As a rule of evidence, a fact found to exist at different dates may
be of such a nature that its continuance during the intervening period
may be legally assumed.67 In other words, there should be a rebuttable
presumption that if the marketing activity has been continuous before
May 6 and after May 7, it must also have been continuous between May
6 and May 7. The very definition of "continuity" implies there are no
breaks or interruptions; activity is continuous when every interval of substantial length will contain the activity. If the marketing activity has
been continuous for a long time, it is easy to infer that it was "'continuous" over a small portion of that time. The inference is strengthened
by evidence of the activity's permanence, e.g., permanent offices, longterm contracts and leases, or a substantial number of employees."6 The
inference is weakened if the intervening time increment is long. The
possibility of a change in conditions will also weaken the presumption.6"
For example, upon issuance of the patent, many sellers will stop marketing
the infringing product; evidence of the withdrawal will rebut the presumption of continuing activity.7 In short, the strength of the presumption is proportional to the length of the marketing activity's existence
and its quality of permanence; the presumption is weakened by the
marketing activity's tendency toward change, a long intervening time
increment or the possibility of a change in conditions.
A National Labor Relations Board case considered a time problem
65. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
66. See notes 67-72 infra and accompanying text.

67. Citizens Finance Co. v. Cole, 47 N.M. 73, 134 P2d 550 (1943).
68. See, e.g., Mayhew v. McFarland, 137 Tex. 391, 153 S.W.2d 428 (1941).
69. 9 WIGMOax, EVIDENCE § 2530 (3d ed. 1940).
70.

If the level drops significantly after the date of the patent issue, venue may be

denied for two reasons: the inference of sustained continuity is seriously weakened,
and there may be evidence of a good faith effort to stop infringing.
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similar to Ralston. An employer comes within the National Labor
Relations Act if he engages in interstate commerce." In NLRB v. J.G.
Boswell Co.,"' the court held that the board could properly infer that
interstate commerce continuing until June 30 would not cease in the
following month, giving jurisdiction over alleged unfair labor practices
beginning in that month. In a patent venue context, the court could
properly infer that continuous marketing activity conducted before the
patent was issued and after the suit was filed would not cease during the
intervening period.
Policy arguments also suggest that courts should look outside the
interval to determine continuity. A rule which restricts proof of continuity to facts occurring after the patent is granted but before the suit
is filed may work an unreasonable hardship on the plaintiff-patent
applicant whose invention is being marketed by the defendant while the
plaintiff's patent is pending.7" If, after the patent is issued, the plaintiff
must wait until he can prove the infringer's marketing activities were
continuous and systematic, the defendant will have ample opportunity to
file a suit for a declaratory judgment against the validity of the plaintiff's
patent in the defendant's home district which may very likely be a forum4
7
far less "hospitable" toward patent validity than the plaintiff's district.
This may interfere with the legislative grant of the patentee's exclusive
right to make, use and sell its invention." The clever infringer will keep
his marketing activity below the "completed sales" level in all districts
which are "friendly" toward patent validity, knowing that he can institute
an action against the plaintiff's patent in his home district shortly
after the patent is issued, well before the plaintiff can establish continuity of activity and venue. If, therefore, the plaintiff-patentee must
wait until the infringer's acts are continuous, the legislative policy of
protecting the patentee will be thwarted." The same policy considerations which required a liberalization of the completed sale standard"
require that courts consider acts outside the crucial interval to establish
continuity of activity.
The plaintiff-patentee P Corporationintroduced earlier should show
that the level of the defendant's marketing activity within the critical
71. National Labor Relations Act § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1964).
72. 136 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1943).
73. The plaintiff cannot sue until the patent is issued, either for infringement
damages or for an injunction against the infringer. Night Club Frocks, Inc. v. Waltztime Dance Frocks, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
74. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
75. See notes 47-49 supra and accompanying text.

76. Id.
77.

See notes 47-48 supra and accompanying text.
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period was high enough, if continuity was present, to establish venue.
P should also show that the defendant D's marketing activities were
continuous before the patent was granted and after the suit was filed,
emphasizing the permanent nature of the activities. If the court finds it
doubtful that continuity was broken during the crucial, intervening time
increment, it will take a new look at the level of marketing activity. If
continuity of activitiy is present, marketing activities which are not
technically sales within the district can sustain venue. Alternatively, P
may advocate adoption of a lower venue-granting level, but courts have
not yet been willing to grant venue without the presence of continuity on
such activities as solicitation of orders."s
78. See notes 36-37 supra and accompanying text. Ralston may have lowered the
venue-granting level sub silentio. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
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